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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OSCAR HACKFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9330 
Except for the statement that plaintiff was employed 
as a sheepherder on December 31, 1957 by Deseret Live-
stock Company and that he was injured in the course 
of his employment on the said date, defendant can accept 
very little of plaintiff's statement of facts and therefore 
desires to restate the facts as follows: 
Plaintiff was injured on December 31, 1957 during 
the course of his employment at a wage of $200 per month 
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by Deseret Livestock Company. The team of horses which 
he was managing became startled and ran away. One or 
more wheels of the wagon ran over his pelvis. 
Deseret Livestock Company is a Utah corporation 
which operates farms and ranches in Utah and elsewhere 
and was a self-insurer under the workmen's Compensation 
Act at the time of the accident. The accident occured in 
Skull Valley, Utah, west of Tooele, Utah. 
Immediately after the accident, plaintiff was taken 
to the nearest hospital, which was in Tooele, Utah, where 
he was X-rayed and treated by Dr. J. Herbert Milburn, 
M.D., of 154 South Main, Street, Tooele, Utah. The X-rays 
of Dr. Milburn taken at the time of his admission to the 
Tooele Hospital and again at the time of his release about 
ten weeks later, showed that the plaintiff had suffered a 
fractured pelvis but that the fracture had nicely healed. 
There was no indication whatsoever that there was any 
fracture of the spine as alleged in plaintiff's statement of 
facts. 
After his release, plaintiff continued to complain of 
some discomfort and pain, and after consultation between 
the company's management and Dr. Milburn, plaintiff was 
referred to Dr. A. M. Okelberry, who is generally recog-
nized by his profession as well as laymen as being an out-
standing physician in this particular line. Dr. Okelberry 
examined plaintiff on or about August 9, 195-8, and a report 
from Dr. Okelberry was sent to the company, to Dr. Mil-
burn and to the Utah Industrial Commission (R-2). 
In this report, Dr. Okelberry among other things stat-
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ed that "There was relatively little displacement, and in 
the film taken in April, union of the fractures was well 
established." He further indicated that "While operative 
treatment might be required to get this man back to work, 
it was believed advisable to provide him with a course of 
eight or ten physiotherapy treatments consisting of heat 
massage, and special exercises to improve his strength. 
He will be seen for a check up examination and reevalua-
tion in a couple of weeks. Arrangements have b.-:::2n made 
for Mr. Tage S. Sponbeck to carry out the treatments 
required." 
Plaintiff continued under Dr. Okelberry's treatments 
and care but was haphazard in keeping his appointments. 
Since he refused to take the doctor's advice and to keep 
certain appointments, in May, 1959, the employer company 
stopped paying compensation to him to bring matters to 
a head. Stopping the compensation checks had the desired 
effect, and on June 13, 1959 plaintiff again presented him-
self for reexamination. A report of the results of this re-
examination was prepared by Dr. Okelberry under date 
of July 6, 1959 (R-9) and submitted to the employer com-
pany, the Industrial Commission, and others. Part of this 
report states: 
"Since it has not been possible to obtain a sat-
isfactory result from the conservative methods of 
treatment which have been provided, and since he 
has been likewise unable to obtain any lasting relief 
from the numerous chiropractic treatments which 
he has apparently had, he was again advised to 
have a myelogram examination. With this proced-
ure it should be possible to arrive at a still more 
definite diagnosis and thereby be more positive 
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about advising treatment. From a clinical stand-
point, I believe his lumbrosacral joint should . be 
explored for a disc rupture and a bone graft fuswn 
done. Since Mr. Hackford does not wish to avail 
himself of this additional diagnostic measure, or 
further treatment I believe that a settlement 
should be reached ~ith him on an estimated partial 
permanent disability that would be expected were 
he to submit to the treatment above indicated. This 
partial disability is estimated at 15 per cent of loss 
of bodily function." 
On June 15, 1959 by letter (R-5) plaintiff requesed 
permission to change his doctor from Dr. Okelberry to Dr. 
E. F. Walters of 925 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, who is listed as an osteopathic physician and sur-
geon. The employer company opposed this change of doc-
tors on the grounds that it was not to the best inteTests of 
plaintiff (R-4), and the Industrial Commission denied 
plaintiff's request (R-6). 
Thereafter, on or about July 2, 1959, plaintiff filed 
an application with the Industrial Commission for determ-
ination of his claim ( R-7, R-8). 
Pursuant to the statute (37-1-77, Utah Code Annot-
ated, 1953, as amended), the Industrial Comlnission re-
ferred the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel 
on August 11, 1959 (R-16) consisting of Boyd G. Holbrook, 
M.D., Chairman; S. W. Allred, M.D.; and Norman R. Beck, 
M.D. Also pursuant to the same statute, the panel made 
its report to the Industrial Commission on September 21, 
1959, with all members of the panel signing the report 
(R-17, R-18, R-19). After giving detailed results of the 
examination, the panel report concludes: 
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"1. No further treatment or study is indicated. 
"2. This man has 15 per cent loss of bodily 
function as a result of the accident and injuries he 
sustained." 
Plaintiff filed objection to the report of the medical 
panel (R-20) on or about October 19, 1959. But then instead 
of pursuing this objection at this time, plaintiff through 
his attorney attempted to bypass the Industrial Commis-
sion and the procedure set up by statute for such matters 
and filed a complaint against Deseret Livestock Company 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
(Case No. 124694) seeking judgment against the employer 
company. The employer company was served with a sum-
mons in this case March 10, 1960, and in due tim~ entered 
a special appearance to make a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint on the grounds the district court had no jurisdiction, 
which motion was granted by the district court on March 
24, 1960. 
On March 31, 1960 plaintiff asked for a hearing on 
his objections to the medical panel report and pointed out 
that the doctors making the report should be required to 
attend to be available for examination and cross-exam-
ination (R-22). Shortly thereafter, on April 19, 1960, the 
commission called a hearing on the plaintiff's application 
for adjustment of claim (R-23), and pursuant to said call 
the hearing was held May 16, 1960, presided over by Com-
mission Chairman Otto W. Wiesley as referee, and attend-
ed by all members of the said medical panel as well as the 
parties and their attorneys. 
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On June 16, 1960, the commission rendered its decis-
ion, which decision, signed by all members of the commis-
sion, found that the said accident had resulted in 
permanent partial disability of 15 per cent loss of bodily 
function which would entitle plaintiff to compensation for 
30 weeks at $35 per week, or $1,050; further that any dis-
ability over and above the 15 per cent loss of bodily func-
tion was caused by degenerative arthritis not related to 
or aggravated by the injury. (R-61, R-62). 
On July 7, 1960 plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing 
(R-63), which motion was denied (R-64). From this denial 
order plaintiff obtained a writ of review from this court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIF~ WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF LIFE, 
LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRAR-
ILY OR EX PARTE BUT RATHER FOLLOWED 
THE PROCEDURE SET UP BY STATUTE. 
POINT III. 
THE AWARD IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
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POINT IV. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDINGS OF 
FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF'S POINT NO. IV HAS NO PARTIC-
ULAR APPLICATION HERE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIF:F WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF LIFE, 
LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW. 
In answer to plaintiff's argument I. (plaintiff's brief, 
pages four and five and six), the procedure to be followed 
in such cases is duly set up by statute and/or the consti-
tution of the state of Utah; said procedure therefore con-
stitutes due process of law; and said procedure was 
followed in detail in this matter. 
Section 35-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited by 
plaintiff (plaintiff's brief, page five) as legal proof that the 
commission's acts herein were a "complete nullity" is 
not applicable in any way to this case, as is evident on 
its face. Plaintiff has questioned the authority of the 
referee to take testimony. 
It is well established by law, decision of this court, 
and custom, that the Industrial Commission does have the 
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power and authority to delegate to a deputy or a member 
of the commission the power under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act to take testimony in such matters. This 
practice has been followed almost universally by the In-
dustrial Commission since its inception in 1917. In addi-
tion, Section 35-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, gives 
the commission the power to adopt rules and regulations 
governing procedure before it, and Section 35-1-11, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, authorizes the commission to em-
ploy a secretary, examiners, experts, clerks, physicians, 
stenographers, and other assistants. 
In Utah Copper Company vs. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, et al, 193 P 23 (decided October 22, 1920), this 
court held that the Industrial Commission may delegate 
to a deputy the power under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act to take testimony. In that case, testimony upon 
which an_ award was made was taken before a referee, 
who was not even a member of the commission. Appel-
lant's counsel objected on grounds that the commission 
had no power or authority to delegate to a referee the 
right to hear testimony, moved to stay the proceedings, 
and requested that the application be heard before the 
commission or some members thereof. This court held 
that the commission could appoint a referee to take the 
testimony, but that the referee does not and can not make 
any award or make any binding order respecting an award. 
In the instant case, the referee was the chairman of the 
Industrial Commission, but he made no decision or award. 
The findings, conclusions and order were made and signed 
by the entire commission (R-17, R-18, R-19). This practice 
of designating one member as a referee or a non-member 
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referee to take testimony is almost universally followed 
by most of the administrative commissions of the Utah 
state government. We submit that a requirement that all 
commissioners be present at all hearings, wherever held, 
would be expensive and would work an almost impossible 
hardship on them in the conduct of their official duties. 
POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRAR-
ILY OR EX PARTE BUT RATHER FOLLOWED 
THE PROCEDURE SET UP BY STATUTE. 
Much of the argument which could be advanced under 
this point is contained in the foregoing under Point I. of 
this brief. From the outset this claim was handled in de-
tail by the commission in the manner set up by statute 
as the record in this case shows. The action and decision 
of the commission were based on the investigation of med-
ical men who were appointed and who conducted their 
inquiries in accordance with law. A hearing was given 
plaintiff as soon as he requested one after he had taken 
a futile side jaunt into the district court, and any and all 
statements made by the commissibn or its chairman were 
not opinions but were based upon the scientific findings 
of highly qualified medical men duly appointed to make 
such findings. Plaintiff attempts to show bias on the part 
of the commission chairman, but this honorable court has 
known Chairman Wiesley and his record over a period of 
18 years. We do not feel it is necessary to defend his per-
formance and his record so well known to this court. 
Plaintiff attempts to attack the admissibility, validity, 
or competence of the medical panel's report, and by in-
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ference the reports by Dr. Okelberry, to be found in the 
record. The basis of this attack is not clearly stated, but 
it is indicated by plaintiff that the medical panel report 
was influenced by the commission chairman and that it 
was not made under oath. There is no law or custom 
which requires such reports to be made under oath. 
As to the admissibility and competence of the medical 
panel's report, this court has held such reports admissible 
and competent under similar circumstances. 
In Uta-Carbon Coal Company et al, vs. Industrial Com-
mission, et al, 104 U t. 567, 140 P2nd (decided by this court 
July 29, 1943), plaintiff attacks the competence of X-rays 
and a diagnosis report made to the Industrial Commission 
by an X-ray specialist to whom the employee had been 
sent by the Industrial Commission pursuant to statutory 
requirement. 
Concerning it, this court says, in part: 
"It is our opinion that a report of this type 
comes within the exception to the hearsay rule and 
is such a one as is described in Rule 516, American 
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, pages 275, 
276, to wit: . . . evidence of a writing made as a 
record, report, or memorandum of facts and con-
clusions concerning an act, event, or condition ... 
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of each 
matt~r stated ~herein in compliance with statutory 
requirements If ... (a) the maker of the writing 
wa~ duly authori.zed pursuant to statute to perform 
designated functiOn~, performance of which by per-
sons not so authorized was forbidden by statute, 
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and was required by statute to file a written report 
in a designated place or office setting forth speci-
fied matters relating to the performance of those 
functions and the persons or things connected 
therewith, and (b) the writing was made and filed 
by him as a report so required by the statute." 
This is exactly the case now before the court with the 
medical panel report. It was required by Section 35-1-77, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the procedure set up there 
was followed. 
We believe that the law is well established that in 
civil code procedure it is the general rule that all docu-
ments and writings required by statutes and prepared and 
filed in accordance therewith are prima facie evidence of 
what they contain. They, of course, can be challenged by 
other evidence or their contents attacked or contradicted 
or refuted by proper evidence, but otherwise they stand 
as evidence for what they purport to be. 
The three medical panel doctors were present at the 
hearing to be available to the plaintiff for examination or 
cross-examination pursuant to plaintiff's written request 
(R-22), but at the hearing plaintiff decided against cross-
examining any of the medical panel doctors or questioning 
their report. And plaintiff's failure to in any way question 
the panel physicians or their report was no oversight, it 
was more of an adamant refusal to do so. Note exchange 
between plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Oliver, and referee (R-41, 
beginning line 20): 
"MR OLIVER: I'll call Mr. Hackford. 
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THE REFEREE: Just a moment. We have these 
three panel doctors here. Do you want to cross-
examine them? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
THE REFEREE: You don't? 
MR. OLIVER: No. 
THE REFEREE: You should have told us. These 
people cost money to bring them up here. 
MR. OLIVER: I didn't ask you to bring them up 
here. 
THE REFEREE: We have to under the law. If 
you don't want to cross-examine them, we'll 
excuse them. 
MR. OLIVER: No. I don't have any cross-exam-
ination." 
(Discussion off the record). 
"THE REFEREE: You may proceed." 
During the discussion off the record and again later 
on during the hearing and on the record, counsel for the 
employer was assured by the referee that the case history 
and the medical panel report were in evidence as part of 
the record. At page 50, beginning on line 9, there is thi~ 
exchange: 
"MR. OLIVER: I believe you may cross-examine 
(the plaintiff was on the stand). 
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MR. ROBINSON: Mr. Chairman, we think the rec-
ord has the case history of this. Is there any 
point in going into it here? 
THE REFEREE: No. 
MR. ROBINSON: His refusal to go to Dr. Okelberry 
on ceTtain occasions and to accept the treat-
ments suggested? 
MR. OLIVER: Just a minute. I object to that. 
MR. ROBINSON: I'm asking a question. 
THE REFEREE: Now wait a minute, both of you. 
The Supmere Court of the state of Utah says 
everything in this record is in evidence. 
MR. OLIVER: Well, the medical report is not in 
evidence. The statute prohibits it. 
THE REFEREE: No, it isn't prohibited. 
MR. ROBINSON: I didn't want to unnecessarily 
prolong this hearing if it's all repetitious. 
THE REFEREE: It's in. 
MR. ROBINSON: If the case history is in the rec-
ord (and) the medical report of the panel, I 
only have one or two questions, and those are 
these." 
Even though this court had not held that writings and 
documents required by law are admissible as evidence 
(Uta-Carbon Coal Co. vs. Industrial Commission, supra), 
the referee, acting for and on behalf of the commission, was 
within his authority in ruling that the medical panel re-
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port and documents giving the case history of the claim 
were, as part of the record, in evidence. 
Section 35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, says: 
"Rules of evidence before commission. The 
commission shall not be bound by the usual com-
mon law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any 
technical or formal rules of procedure, other than 
as herein provided; but may make its investigations 
in such matter as in its judgment is best calculated 
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties 
and to carry out justly the spirit of this title." 
Thus the commission did not act arbitrarily or ex 
parte in deciding this case. All the medical reports and 
facts were weighed, a medical panel of three outstanding 
physicians and surgeons were ordered to investigate and 
report, and then a hearing was held, at which hearing 
testimony of plaintiff's own medical witnesses in no way 
contradicted, but rather agreed with the findings of Dr. 
Okelberry and the medical panel, which was not at vari-
ance with Dr. Okelberry's findings. 
Dr. L. H. 0. Stobbe, plaintiff's principal medical wit-
ness, testified in response to plaintiff counsel's questioning 
(R-29): 
"Q. Did you examine his back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What condition did you find there? 
A. As said before, cyposis (?) and scoliosis. Tilting. 
Dimpling. 
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Q. And Doctor, did you determine the cause of that 
condition 
A. We X-rayed his back, and found there a degen-
erative arthritis involving the intervertebral 
discs between the 11th and 12th dorsal verta-
bra, and between the 12th dorsal and the first 
lumbar vertebra. Otherwise we found a fairly 
normal spine. 
Q. From your examination of the back that you 
have just described, did you determine from 
your examination whether it had ever been 
broken at any time? Or fractured? 
A. No, sir I couldn't find that. Furthermore, the 
hip regions and pelvic areas were surprisingly 
good considering the general condition of the 
patient." 
And then, under cross-examination of Dr., Stobbe by 
employer's counsel: (R-33). 
"Q. Dr. Stobbe, did you in your examination de-
termine what injury had occured from the 
accident? 
A. I'm afraid I couldn't. It was too far removed 
from the time of the accident. I discussed this 
with Dr. Okelberry and with the Deseret Live-
stock Company on February 4, 1960. 
Q. Would you disagree with Dr. Okelberry in any 
of his findings, after your examination? 
A. I think there was nothing there for us to dis-
agree on." 
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POINT III. 
THE AWARD IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
Most of plaintiff's arguments and citations under his 
point numbered III. are either not applicable here or have 
been answered herein above. 
Plaintiff's allegation that there was a prolonged delay 
between the time he requested a hearing March 31, 1960 
(after his meandering into the district court) and the hear-
ing date, May 16, 1960, is not well founded. The hearing 
was called by the commission on April 19, 1960, only 19 
days after the date of plaintiff's request and was held 26 
days thereafter, a total lapse of 45 days. The demands of 
proper notice would consume this amount of time, and 
for plaintiff's counsel to complain over this short lapse of 
time and attempt to make it reversible error is the height 
of indelicacy after he wasted nearly six months in "off-
side maneuvering." 
Plaintiff (on page 12 of his brief) claims he had no 
pre-hearing knowledge of a letter written to the employer 
by Dr. Okelberry on July 6, 1959 (R-9), a copy of which 
was sent to the Industrial Commission by the doctor, and 
plaintiff alleges this lack of knowledge on his part to be 
reversible error. Plaintiff's counsel may be entitled to a 
word of regret from Deseret Livestock Company if he did 
not get a copy of this letter, and in such case an apology 
is hereby extended on behalf of the company. But whether 
or not plaintiff had pre-hearing knowledge of the July 6, 
1959 letter from Dr. Okelberry is immaterial to the decis-
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ion in this case, since it was not an official writing nor 
one required by statute. The medical panel report was 
the official writing required by the statute, and when its 
finding and conclusions were not in any way contradicted 
or varied by the other testimony, it became the basis of 
the commission's award. 
Plaintiff makes no claim that he did not have knowl-
edge of or a copy of the medical panel report, and, of 
course, he did have both, as the record shows he objected 
to the report (R-20). 
Plaintiff's brief makes a somewhat half-hearted at-
tempt to show that plaintiff's present physical condition 
(misalignment and arthritis of the spine) was caused by 
the accident. 
There is not one scintilla of evidence anywhere in the 
record that the accident injured plaintiff's spine. In fact, 
every attempt by plaintiff counsel to drag an injured spine 
into his case has been completely frustrated by the testi-
mony of even his own expert witnesses (Dr. Stobbe testi-
mony, R-29, R-30, supra). And Dr. Hugh Wayman, plain-
tiff's other medical witness, testified on direct examination 
by plantiff counsel (R-40): 
"Q. Well assume, Doctor, that Mr. Hackford had 
been in an accident where a wagon wheel ran 
over him and broke his back in, that location. 
Would that cause it? 
A. Well, I see no sign of breaks at all. I only see 
misalignment in them. The accident as you 
speak of could cause this misalignment." 
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And then on cross-examination, Dr. Wayman said 
(R-41): 
"Q. You say it could cause it but you also say theTe 
are also other things that could cause that 
misalignment, Doctor? 
A. I have found the same condition in some cases 
that were not run over." 
In this connection, it should be remembered that Dr. 
Wayman first examined the plaintiff sometime "in 1958" 
(R-36, line 19) and that he made his first X-rays of plain-
tiff "'probably nine months after I checked him first." 
(R-37). So these first X-rays by Dr. Wayman were taken 
12 to 20 months afteT the accident and would be of little 
use in determining what damage the accident had caused 
to the spine. 
POINT IV. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDINGS OF 
FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL. 
As against plaintiff's weak and futile attempts to 
blame the accident for plaintiff's present physical condi-
tion, we have a positive finding of fact by the Industrial 
Commission that "any disability over and above the 15 
per cent loss of bodily function was caused by degener-
ative arthritis not related to or aggravated by the injury 
of December 31, 1957." (R-62). 
Section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, recites: 
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" ... After each formal hearing, it shall be the 
duty of the commission to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in writing and file the same 
with its secretary. The findings of fact and conclus-
ions of the commission on questions of fact shall 
be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to 
review; such questions of fact shall include ulti-
mate facts and the findings and conclusions of the 
commission ... " 
This question was ruled upon most recently by this 
court in the case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. vs. 
Industrial Commission, 84 Ut. 481, 36 P.2d 972, wherein 
the court said in part: 
" ... In the determining of facts the conclusions 
of the commission are like the verdict of a jury, 
and will not be interfered with by this court when 
supported by some substantial evidence." 
We submit that under the case and statute cited, the 
Industrial Commission's findings of fact in this case are 
conclusive and final and are not subject to review. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF'S POINT NO. IV HAS NO PARTIC-
ULAR APPLICATION HERE. 
Plaintiff's point No. 1V. to the effect that "Equity 
Will Provide a Remedy Where None Exists at Law" can-
not be raised in this appeal. Since the relief sought below 
and the proceeding thereunder is purely statutory, no 
equity or equitable remedy is available. 
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CONCLUSION 
The only issue before this court is the degree of per-
manent disability resulting from the accident. The plaintiff 
claims that he is totally and permanently disabled but has 
utterly failed to prove that his total disability, if such 
exists, is the result of the accident. 
On the other hand, the Industrial Commission, as the 
legally constituted finder of the facts, has determined that 
plaintiff's disability resulting from the accident is 15 per 
cent loss of bodily function and made an award according-
ly. This determination is based principally on the investi-
gation and findings of a medical panel of three outstanding 
\ 
medical men, and on the supporting report of Dr. A. M. 
Okelberry and the supporting testimony of Dr. L. ·H. 0. 
Stobbe, the plaintiff's own witness. 
Under all the circumstances, we submit that this find-
ing of fact and the award which was made by the commis-
sion pursuant thereto are conclusive and final, and should 
accordingly be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General 
GORDON A MADSEN 
Assistant Attorne; General 
DAVID A. ROBINSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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